This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex-post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state-provided childcare support.
Introduction
This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex-post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. This non-convexity can result in a large discontinuity in educational choice and labour market participation across workers. The paper shows that for some workers, a competitive labour market would imply they invest significantly in education and participate with a high probability in the labour market. But wages below marginal product (in a non-competitive labour market) and increasing returns to education together imply a non-marginal switch to low educational investment and home production. These large substitution effects yield large welfare losses and so corrective taxation plays an important role. Although there is underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation, which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state-provided childcare support.
The paper considers a hold-up problem where in the first phase of their lives, youngsters increase their future workplace ability by investing in general skills. Those investments are made prior to becoming employed in the workplace. Clearly some skill investments, such as primary school education in literacy and numeracy skills, are invaluable both in the home and in the workplace.
But the focus here is on educational choice past the compulsory school level, by which time literacy and numeracy skills have presumably been well honed. Instead students might further invest in a university degree in mathematics or a qualification in information technology, imbuing them with expertise that is valuable in the workplace but is unlikely to increase their skills in the home.
A central feature of the model is that there are increasing marginal returns to education. We stress that these increasing returns do not arise because we assume a Mincer wage equation with increasing returns. Indeed the arguments are consistent with a Mincerian wage rate w = a + e where the wage rate w depends on endowed ability a and is linearly increasing in education e. But such a wage equation does not describe the marginal return to education. For example, the person who intends to specialise entirely in child rearing and home-making has a zero financial return to investing in workplace skills, regardless of the size of the Mincer wage effect. The marginal return to education depends both on the Mincer wage effect and expected labour supply, where increased labour supply implies human capital investments are "used" more intensively in the workplace. We shall show there are three reasons for increasing returns to education. First, there are increasing marginal returns to education because of a participation effect. More highly skilled workers earn higher wages in the workplace and so are more likely to participate in the workplace, thereby raising the ex ante expected returns to human capital investment. Second, increasing returns arise through an increasing labour supply effect, where more educated workers may find it worthwhile to work longer hours. But with a frictional labour market there is a third reason for increasing marginal returns to education -an increasing wage competitiveness effect. We show that firms bid more competitively for the worker's services as the value of employment increases. As wage compression decreases at higher productivity levels, the marginal return to education increases as education increases.
A second important feature of the paper is that it assumes workers have different productivities both at home and in the workplace. We introduce this assumption not only because it is realistic, although that is clearly an advantage. 1 But more importantly, it allows us to demonstrate how expected home productivity affects optimal educational choice and labour supply, where home and workplace productivities vary across individuals. Specifically we show that the deadweight losses that arise through an imperfectly competitive labour market are not equally spread across all workers.
Increasing returns to education coupled with an imperfectly competitive labour market generates an "under-participation trap". If the labour market were competitive, then workers in that trap would choose a high level of education and high expected labour supply in the workplace. But because the labour market is not competitive and so wages paid are below marginal product, they substitute instead to home production. The increasing returns to education, however, imply the substitution effect is non-marginal for workers in this "trap". Instead they make very low skills investments ex ante, and participate with low probability in the labour market ex post. This large substitution effect implies a correspondingly large deadweight loss.
1 High returns to home productivity might be realized by those involved with care of young children or elderly parents, or for individuals with a taste for leisure or for home renovations, or for those with a strong aversion to workplace employment. For childless households, non-participation might be associated with pure leisure, although time use studies do show that -even in households without children -considerable time is devoted to home-related activities such as cooking and cleaning.
The next section describes the model and Section 3 determines equilibrium remuneration and participation rates of workers by productivity type. Section 4 examines the worker's optimal investment decision and Section 5 develops the implications for optimal childcare policies. We establish that a participation subsidy, paid to the worker, not only corrects the ex-post under-participation problem, but also corrects the ex-ante under-education problem.
The Model
Each individual is productive both at home and in the workplace. A representative person is born in the first period with ability a and has expectations of future home productivity b. In the first period, the individual at cost φ(k) can acquire k units of general human capital, whereupon the worker's second period productivity in the workplace is α = a + k. Assume φ is continuously diffentiable, strictly convex and φ(0) = φ 0 (0) = 0. The discussion section considers a more general specification where higher ability types can become more productive at lower marginal cost; i.e., φ = φ(a, k)
with marginal cost ∂φ/∂k decreasing in a (and so education and ability are complementary inputs in productivity). We shall show that this variation makes little material difference to the results.
A useful simplifying assumption is that human capital investment k does not affect second period home productivity b. Again in the discussion section we describe what happens if, in addition, skills investment k increases home productivity. The results presented below hold as long as the effect of skills investment on market productivity, α, is sufficiently large relative to its impact on home productivity b. For ease of exposition, however, we assume for now that home productivity is fixed.
In the second period, the worker has a unit time endowment which is allocated between time spent in home production (h) and in the workplace (l), so that h + l = 1. Note that home production can also be interpreted as leisure. There are diminishing marginal returns to home production. If the worker allocates time h to home production, assume the value of home output is bx(h) where x(.) is increasing, differentiable and concave with x(0) = 0.
There are constant marginal returns to labour in the workplace; a worker with workplace productivity α who supplies l units of labour to the workplace generates revenue αl. One could instead assume diminishing marginal returns to labour, but if the worker's output is small relative to the scale of the firm, the constant returns assumption seems a reasonable approximation. The critical ingredient for what follows is that this revenue function R = αl exhibits increasing returns to scale in productivity and labour supply. As this is an important feature of the model, it is worth discussing it a little. For example in the competitive case, one typically assumes given wage rate w, the worker earns income E = wl by supplying l hours to the market. A Mincer type wage equation, where wage w = w(a, k) depends on education k, then implies earnings E = lw(a, k). Even if there are diminishing returns to education in wages (i.e. w is concave in k) note that earnings E = lw(a, k) exhibit joint increasing returns with respect to labour supply and education k. It is this non-convexity which is fundamental to the results. One interpetation is that increased labour supply implies human capital investments are 'used' more intensively. For example zero labour supply implies zero human capital usage, and the marginal return to education is then zero regardless of the magnitude of the Mincer wage effect ∂w/dk.
The market failure is a hold-up problem: the worker invests in human capital in the first period, and wages are determined in the second period in an imperfectly competitive labour market. One modelling approach would be to specify an equilibrium search framework where wages are determined by Nash bargaining (e.g. Pissarides (2000)) or by wage posting with on the job search (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)). In those frameworks, equilibrium implies workers ex post earn less than their marginal product and the hold-up problem implies each worker ex ante underinvests in skills. But given our focus on optimal labour market policy, the monoposony framework as described in Bhaskar and To (1999) provides a simpler equilibrium framework. Like the Nash bargaining approach, the Bhaskar and To (1999) framework implies equilibrium wage compression; that wages need not increase one-for-one with an increase in labour market productivity. The assumed market structure is analogous to a Hotelling pricing game with n ≥ 2 competing firms. 3 Consider a representative worker who is characterised by productivities (α, b) which are observed by all firms. 4 Firms differ in their nonpecuniary attributes, such as geographical location and other nonwage job characteristics. Workers have heterogeneous preferences where the more distant are the i-th firm's characteristics from the worker's preferred characteristics, the larger is the worker's disutility cost c i associated with employment at that firm. Note that this cost c i is a fixed cost to working at firm i and is analogous to a transport or commuting cost. 5 The representative worker's employment preferences c i , i = 1, .., n are private information and considered as i.i.d. draws from c.d.f. F . Assume F is twice differentiable and its density is decreasing over its support [0, c];
i.e., F is concave. Each firm i simultaneously makes a contract offer (y i , l i ), where y i is the amount paid to the worker in return for providing l i units of labour time. Given those contract offers, the worker either accepts one, say at firm i, and so obtains period 2 utility
or rejects all and so obtains period 2 utility U 2 = bx(1) through home production. Note the worker is risk neutral in consumption. Should the worker accept firm i's contract offer, firm i makes profit αl i − y i , while the other firms obtain zero profit.
Throughout we shall only consider symmetric pure strategy equilibria. In the second period and given (α, b), each firm i offers contract (y i , l i ) to maximise expected profit. The symmetric Nash equilibrium implies all offer the same contract (y * (α, b), l * (α, b)). Given those equilibrium contract offers in the second period, the worker in the first period computes expected second period utility,
In anticipation of the results, it is useful to define the competitive benchmark where the market wage rate equals marginal product; w = α. Let V denote the value of employment in that case
which is the (maximised) value of earnings net of foregone home production. As the worker prefers pure home production if c i > V for all i, the worker's participation probability in a competitive labour market is
Conditional on labour market participation, let l * (α, b) denote the optimal labour supply decision;
i.e.
and note that the Envelope Theorem implies l * = ∂V /∂α. Claim 0 describes their basic properties.
Claim 0. Characterisation of V, l * .
(i) l * = 0 and V = 0 for α ≤ bx 0 (1);
(ii) l * ∈ (0, 1) and V > 0 are both strictly increasing in α and strictly decreasing in b for
Claim 0 follows from standard optimisation theory. We shall refer to α = bx 0 (0) as the full time margin and productivities α ∈ [bx 0 (0), ∞) as the full-time employment region, noting that l * = 1
is optimal for such α. We shall refer to α = bx 0 (1) as the part-time margin, and the interval (bx 0 (1), bx 0 (0)) as the part-time employment region as l * ∈ (0, 1) is optimal for such α. Note that α ≤ bx 0 (1) implies there is no gain to trade as home productivity strictly dominates workplace productivity.
Equilibrium Wages
Given the set of contract offers {(y i , l i )} i=1,..,n and idiosyncratic utility costs c i , the worker's second period payoff is
where the worker either accepts one firm's offer or rejects all. This section characterizes the (symmetric, pure strategy) Nash equilibrium where each firm i simultaneously makes a contract offer (y i , l i ) to maximise expected profit, given the job acceptance strategy of the worker.
As productivities are observed, each firm's optimal contract offer implies l i = l * . Given the set of optimal contract offers, {(
.,n , the worker's optimal job acceptance strategy is to accept employment at firm i if
Note that firm i faces two margins: a participation margin and a poaching margin. The participation margin requires that the job offer must fully compensate for foregone home production; i.e. the worker considers firm i's offer only if
The poaching margin requires that firm i's offer is also preferred to all other wage offers; i.e. y i − c i > y j − c j for all j 6 = i. Theorem 1 now describes the symmetric Nash equilibrium to this contract posting game.
Theorem 1. Equilibrium Contract Offers.
For any (α, b) with V > 0, a pure strategy, symmetric contract-posting equilibrium implies each firm offers contract (y * , l * ) where
Proof is in the Appendix.
The equilibrium wage offer, y * , fully compensates the worker for foregone home production and offers additional surplus s * . The worker participates in the labour market (i.e. accepts a job offer)
if and only if y * − c i + bx(1 − l * ) > bx(1) for at least one i, which is equivalent to c i < s * for at least one firm. Hence the above equilibrium wage offers imply the worker's participation probability is
The equilibrium surplus offered, s * as defined in (1), depends on V, the value of employment, and on the number of competing firms. As n becomes arbitrarily large, competition between firms implies s * converges to V and equilibrium converges to the competitive case. However, for finite n, firms shave those offers so that s * < V. The equilibrium choice, described by (1), reflects the standard monopsony trade-off between lower wage offers and lower employment. Optimality requires that these two margins are equal. The left hand side of (1) is the probability of employment (given by P (s * )/n) and describes the marginal loss in profit should, say, firm 1 offer slightly more surplus than the equilibrium offer. The right hand side describes the marginal increase in firm 1's profit by making a more attractive offer which increases the probability the potential employee will accept it.
The first term in square brackets on the RHS, f (s
, is the measure of workers who are marginally attracted from non-participation, that is, workers whose c 1 = s * and c j > s * for j 6 = 1.
The second term is the measure of workers marginally poached from a competing firm j, where the worker is indifferent between accepting firm 1's offer and a firm j 0 s offer (that is, c 1 = c j < s * and c k > c 1 for k 6 = 1, j), and where this state potentially occurs with each of the n − 1 competing firms.
Also note that (1) describes the optimal contract offer with pure monopsony, where n = 1, and there is no poaching margin.
The critical feature for what follows is that the equilibrium contract offer implies both wage compression and underparticipation in the labour market.
is increasing and continuously differentiable in V with:
(ii) ds * /dV < 1 and s
Proof is in the Appendix. Notice that d can be thought of as a measure of labor market stickiness, as described for example in Stevens (1994) .
It can be shown that the same properties of s * occur when F is only log concave; i.e. when F 00 F < F 02 , but the proof is both long and tedious. 6 Formally the equilibrium outcome described in Theorem 1 corresponds to an n-buyer first price auction, where the seller has private independent match values. Although assuming F is concave (or log concave) is sufficient to guarantee nonparadoxical comparative statics; i.e. more productive workers receive higher wage offers, establishing that a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium necessarily exists is less straightforward. The Technical
Appendix describes the formal existence problem. In what follows, we simply assume a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. To understand why there is no wage compression at high V , recall that a firm faces two 6 Establishing that 0 < ds * dV < 1 in (9) in the Appendix requires showing
where s * is defined by (1) . Using (1) to substitute out (V − s * ) it is possible, but tedious, to show that log concavity of F , which implies F F 00 < F 02 , is sufficient to imply the above inequality at s * .
oligopsony margins: a poaching margin and a participation margin. By offering higher wages, a firm might not only attract an employee from a competing firm -the poaching margin -but also attract a non-participant into the market sector.
The participation margin does not bind for workers with sufficiently high V that, in equilibrium, they accept a job offer with probability one. As noted above, a useful analogy is the Hotelling pricing literature where we might interpret c i as the worker's transport cost to work at firm i. The case "V sufficiently high that an offer is always accepted" is typically referred to as a "covered market". The equilibrium is that all firms offer a wage equal to the worker's value of output less "price" d > 0.
Equilibrium d reflects the marginal probability that a small increase in the offered wage will poach the worker away from the competing firms and, in a symmetric equilibrium, d depends only on the number of competing firms and the distribution of transport costs. The lump-sum deduction implies there is no wage compression.
In contrast, the participation margin binds for workers with V less than c + d. Such workers include low workplace-productivity workers and intermediate productivity workers with high home
productivities. An important property of the Hotelling pricing structure is that, as the value of employment increases, wage competition at the margin becomes more intense. In particular, (9) in the Appendix implies ds * /dV = 0.5 at V = 0, ds * /dV < 1 for V < c + d and ds * /dV → 1 as
Hence wages rise more quickly with productivity as the participation margin peters out, where ds * /dV = 1 for all V ≥ c + d.
II. Equilibrium Underparticipation
The worker's participation probability is P (s
Given the competitive outcome would imply s * = V, Claim 1 implies:
The underparticipation problem arises as worker preferences or disutility costs c i are not observed and firms offer less than full surplus. If the value of workplace productivity is sufficiently high, however, that the worker participates with probability one, then the privately optimal participation decision coincides with the socially optimal one.
The Worker's Optimal Education Decision
To identify the privately optimal investment decision in the first period, Claim 2 now computes expected second period utility, which is denoted U * 2 (α, b).
Claim 2. For any (α, b) and offers as described in Theorem 1:
Expected second period utility equals the option value of home production plus the expected surplus from employment, which depends on V = V (α, b) and labour market imperfections, as
In the first period, given ability a and expected home productivity b, the worker's optimal investment decision solves:
where the worker chooses second period productivity α ≥ a at investment cost φ(k), where k = α−a.
The necessary condition for a maximum is
i.e., the worker sets the marginal return to education equal to its marginal cost, where (3) implies the marginal return to education, denoted MR, is
Note, MR depends on three components: P (s * ) is the probability the worker participates in the labour market; ds * /dV is the rate at which offered compensation s * increases with V ; and ∂V /∂α describes how V increases with productivity α.
In a competitive labour market with earnings function E = αl, the Envelope Theorem would imply marginal return to education ∂E/∂α = l * , which is simply expected labour supply. The above expression is more complicated as there are labour market imperfections. Nevertheless the interpretation is the same. The definition of V and the Envelope Theorem imply ∂V /∂α = l * .
Hence [P (.)][∂V /∂α] together describe expected labour supply. The marginal return to education is expected labour supply times the marginal increase in wage through higher productivity. (i) Participation effects: an increase in productivity implies firms offer better wages which increases the worker's participation probability; i.e. P (s * ) increases as α increases. The higher participation probability increases directly the marginal return to education.
(ii) Increasing labour supply: ∂V /∂α equals l * and as an increase in workplace productivity implies an increase in labour supply l * (Claim 0), this further increases the marginal return to education.
(iii) Increasing wage competiveness: as the value of employment V increases, firms at the margin bid more competitively for the worker's services. In particular, ds * /dV = 0.5 at V = 0, while Although MR is continuous, its slope is not continuous at the full time margin (where α = bx 0 (0)).
In particular, labour supply l * ≡ ∂V /∂α is strictly increasing in α in the part-time employment region, where increasing labour supply generates increasing returns to education [see (ii) above].
At the full time margin, however, labour supply becomes constrained l * = 1 and this source of increasing returns stops discontinuously at that point. ) is the marginal cost to skill accumulation and is denoted MC a in Figure 1 . The assumptions on φ imply MC a = 0 at α = a and is strictly increasing in α. The optimal skills investment decision of a worker with ability a occurs where MC a crosses MR. As demonstrated in Figure 1 , there may be multiple intersections -the middle one describes a minimum, the other two describe local maxima. We now determine which of those local maxima describe the global maximum.
Consider the interesting case of a person of ability type a = a M , as drawn in In contrast a decrease in ability a < a M implies the MC a curve shifts to the left (and marginal cost rises) and so lower ability types strictly prefer the left-side maximum. Such workers train to α < α 1 < bx 0 (0), they have low V ex-post, low participation probabilities and will only consider part-time employment. Increasing returns to education therefore leads to discontinuous investment decisions across ability a M .
To see that this discontinuity generates large deadweight losses, consider the optimal investment and participation decisions in a competitive labour market. Recall that the private marginal return to investment is
As previously explained, the competitive outcome implies s = V and so the social return to educa-tion, denoted SR, is
which is expected labour supply. Hence MR < SR if there is underparticipation, P (s * ) < P (V ), or if there is wage compression ds * /dV < 1.
It follows that MR = SR at very low productivities, where α < bx 0 (1), in which case V = 0 and so MR = SR = 0 (there is no gain to trade). It also follows that MR = SR for very high productivities, where α > α(b), as there is efficient participation and no wage compression.
For intermediate productivities, however, we have MR < SR due to underparticipation and wage compression. Recall that the worker with ability a M is indifferent between investing to α 1 or α 2 . The shaded area describes the deadweight loss associated with the low investment decision. The socially optimal decision is that the worker invests to α s . If the worker invests to α 2 , the resulting deadweight loss corresponds to the Harberger triangle labelled DW L 2 in Figure 2 . If the worker instead invests to α 1 , the large substitution effect implies deadweight loss DW L 1 which is clearly much larger.
Increasing returns to education and an imperfectly competitive labour market can therefore lead to an under-participation trap. Workers with ability a < a M invest in skills where α < α 1 . Having low V, they have low participation probabilities, and only participate in part-time employment (if at all). But the socially optimal decision for these workers may be that they invest to skills α s > bx 0 (0) and participate in full time employment with a high participation probability. The discontinuity in investment behaviour leads to a large deadweight loss. Figure 3 here.
An increase in b to b 0 implies a fall in MR as drawn in Figure 3 . The marginal worker as depicted in Figure 1 , the one with ability a = a M (b) and home productivity b, now strictly prefers to choose low skills α < α 1 should home productivity increase to
undeparticipation trap is increasing in home productivity. It also follows that if home productivity is sufficiently small that a M < 0, then the underparticipation trap disappears.
Of course, the above applies if the marginal cost curve, MC a , is relatively flat. If the marginal cost curve is steep enough, then the part-time employment trap does not exist. Figure 4 depicts this case. 
Discussion
It is well known that an imperfectly competitive labour market may lead to wage compression and underinvestment in general human capital. 7 A key insight here is that it also leads to underparticipation which acts as a multiplier effect -lower participation rates lower still further the marginal 7 See for example Stevens (1994) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) .
return to education. 8 Further, with heterogeneous workers and increasing returns to education, the corresponding welfare losses are largest for a particular subset of workers -those with high workplace ability a but whose home productivity is also relatively high, and so an imperfectly competitive labour market leads to a large substitution to home production. For workers in the "underparticipation trap" the efficient outcome (in a competitive market) implies large investments in human capital and high participation rates in the labour market. But as they do not receive the full return to those investments, they instead substitute to home production -they make low skills investments and participate with low probability in the labour market.
Extensions
Before turning to optimal policy we first discuss two variations on the model. The first relates to the cost of skills acquisition. Suppose that the cost of education is now φ(k, a) where marginal cost ∂φ/∂k is decreasing in a and ∂φ/∂k = 0 at k = 0 as before. Thus higher ability types can accumulate greater skills at lower cost. Note then that an increase in ability implies MC a not only shifts to the right, it also falls. But the overall effect is qualitatively identical to that already considered and so does not affect the insights.
The second variation relates to the assumption that home productivity b is independent of k.
Relaxing this has less innocuous implications. Suppose that b = b(k) and is an increasing function.
Note that, given (α, b) in the second period, Claims 1 and 2 continue to hold. The expected marginal return to training in the first period, however, is now given by:
as home productivity also increases with k. Noting that dα/dk = 1 by assumption and that the Envelope Theorem implies
, we obtain
Note the second term is positive (as 0 ≤ P (s * ), ds * dV ≤ 1) and so, if home productivity is strictly increasing in k, this further increases the marginal return to education. We have already established the first term yields increasing marginal returns. The second term is ambiguous. If for example b(k)
is sufficiently large that P (s * ) = 0, then b 00 < 0 implies decreasing marginal returns to education. As such types do not participate in the labour market, the only effect of education is its impact on home productivity. But it would appear reasonable to assume that university level degree schemes have a larger impact on potential earnings in the workplace than on one's capabilities as a home-maker. If
is relatively small, the first term dominates in (6) and the insights obtained above go through.
Policy
Optimal policy requires increasing the return to participation in the labour market relative to nonparticipation. The obvious approach is either to (i) tax non-participants with a home production tax, or (ii) subsidise participation. The first approach -a tax on non-participation -is unlikely to be politically feasible and so we focus on the latter.
Suppose the government observes the worker's productivity parameters α, b and offers an employment subsidy x = x(V ) to workers who participate in the labour market, where V = V (α, b) as defined before. Repeating the analysis as before and given x ≥ 0, it is straightforward to show that, in a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium surplus offered by firms is s
In other words, the firms extract the employment subsidy from the worker (the −x term), but the equilibrium offer then reflects that the value of workplace employment is V + x. Given such offers, workers obtain net surplus s * (V + x).
To identify the optimal subsidy, note that the competitive outcome implies s = V. Hence implementing the competitive outcome implies optimal employment subsidy, x * , where
This condition identifies the optimal employment subsidy. It follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem and (1) in Theorem 1 that x * (0) = 0, x * (.) is strictly increasing for V < c + d, and
Thus guaranteeing efficient participation and efficient education requires an employment subsidy paid to workers. An education subsidy, in contrast, is inappropriate. Of course for many types the welfare gains through subsidising particpation may be small. Indeed the welfare gain is zero for high ability types who invest in large amounts of education and participate in the labour market with probability one. Instead as clearly demonstrated in Figure 2 , the welfare gains are largest for those who are caught in the "underparticipation" trap. In the uncorrected market, these workers are characterised by relatively high home and workplace abilities, but they choose low education ex ante and have low labour market participation rates. It is well known from empirical studies using European data that women with children at home are characterised by low participation rates and relatively low education levels (see Petrongolo (2004) and references therein). This suggests that individuals most likely to be caught in the "underparticipation trap" are young women who expect to have children. An obvious employment subsidy which targets precisely this group is a state-subsidised childcare scheme, where childcare payments are made conditional on employment.
Such a subsidy potentially generates large welfare gains, for it not only corrects the ex-post underparticipation distortion but also encourages women to invest more in education when young. 9 
Conclusion
It is surprising that the increasing returns argument presented here has received no attention in the profession. Possibly it has been missed as there are decreasing marginal returns to labour supply and, given labour supply, there are also decreasing returns to education. Of course this does not imply a concave programming problem as there are joint increasing returns. When decisions are sequential, as in the hold-up problem considered here, these joint increasing returns generate increasing marginal returns to education in the first period. We have shown that, in an imperfectly competitive labour market, increasing returns to education generate an under-participation trap.
Optimal corrective policy is an employment subsidy, which we argue might be efficiently targeted as a public childcare program.
A popular alternative model of an imperfectly competitive labour market assumes instead search frictions and that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. In particular given (α, b) and free entry of firms, the axiomatic Nash bargaining approach would imply the firm negotiates profit π and labour supply l as
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the worker's bargaining power, bx (1) is the worker's threatpoint [i.e. the value of
home production] and the firm's threatpoint is zero in a free entry equilibrium. By definition of V in the text, this reduces to
and Nash bargaining implies worker remuneration y * satisfies dy * /dV = γ. As in Claim 1, this implies equilibrium wage compression and so one would anticipate the same effects on education and particpation as discussed here. But there are two main advantages to the Bhasker and To (1999) approach. One is that it rules out search externalities, such as thick market and congestion externalities, which would otherwise complicate the policy discussion. It also does not require solving for the steady state distribution of job seeker productivities which, in equilibrium, affects the vacancy creation decision of firms. The simpler approach shows clearly that underparticipation and wage compression generate mutually reinforcing distortions on human capital investment: wage compression implies workers tend to underinvest in workplace skills, and lower skills imply a lower participation probability which further reduces the expected return to human capital accumulation.
In currently ongoing work we examine how increasing returns to education interact with various other market distortions such as (i) endogenous household formation with matching frictions in the marriage market (Booth and Coles, 2005); and (ii) government tax policy, where increasing returns to education causes large substitution effects, and hence large deadweight losses, around the nonparticipant margin (Booth and Coles, 2006a). In a third paper, we show that increasing returns to education arise even in a perfectly competitive labour market (Booth, Coles and Gong, 2006b) and identify these effects empirically using individual-level data. 
with V = V (α, b). Hence given s * , firm 1's best response for s 1 is defined by the first order condition 
A pure strategy, symmetric equilibrium requires firm 1's best response s 1 = s * , and so the above condition implies
The Existence Problem.
Each firm offers a wage which fully compensates for home production and offers additional surplus 
Given the definition of L, (10) describes a restriction on F which guarantees existence of a symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium (where Claim 1 implies s * always exists). Unfortunately computing these terms yields long and unwieldy expressions. Although the restriction to F log concave (or the stronger condition that F is concave) guarantees sensible comparative statics, we have been unable to show it is sufficient to guarantee single peakedness as defined in (10) .
It is well known in the Hotelling framework with linear transport costs that pure strategy equilibria may not exist. The problem there is that demand is discontinuous -a small price cut can imply a jump in demand. Such demand discontinuities do not arise here -idiosyncratic match values imply demand L(.) is continuous in s. We believe the pure strategy symmetric equilibrium exists when F is log concave but have not been able to prove this formally.
